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MAGYAR NEMZET COMMENTS ON CIA STAFF CHANGES

CPYRGHT

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(Anonymous article: "Changing of the Guard at the CIA in Washington")

(Text) The recent sudden change of top personnel at the CIA was surprising in many respects. Retired Admiral Raborn was appointed head of this famous institution, replacing McCone, who was the successor of CIA's most prominent and "durable" boss, Allen Dulles.

The move was surprising for several reasons, primarily for the fact that currently one of the most dangerous adventures of aggressive American policy is in progress in Vietnam, and it has been known for months that the military and political apparatus of the intervention there is greatly influenced by the CIA. It can be regarded as unusual, therefore, that they suddenly "change horses in midstream" at the summit of the American intelligence service during such a large-scale operation. Another surprising aspect is Raborn himself. It had long been expected that McCone would retire from his top CIA position; his assignment was always regarded as temporary ever since the departure of Allen Dulles, who failed in the Cuban adventure. Raborn's name has never appeared among his probable successors, however, and his biography reveals relatively little experience in intelligence work.

As for the new chief, it seems that his appointment was largely a result of President Johnson's decision, since just like the President, Admiral Raborn is a Texan and was associated on several occasions with the then Vice President Johnson in practical matters during his previous activities. The coordination of the work of various groups engaged in the development of the Polaris missile has been the most outstanding task of Raborn's career so far. He accomplished this task in the capacity of chief of the Navy's "Special Planning Bureau."
He worked in the general staff of the Navy at the time of his retirement in September 1963 in order to be able to enter into the deputy chairmanship of one of the key enterprises of the aircraft industry--a traditional customs of generals and admirals--and he became the leading "manager" of the Aerojet General Corporation of California.

The above shows that not so much his experience but more his Texas ties and personal relationship with Johnson predestined the admiral for the assumption of Cia leadership. There are indications that Johnson primarily expects loyalty to himself personally from the new CIA chief, while the "professional" leadership of the intelligence apparatus has been taken over by Richard Helms, who is considered a tested intelligence expert in the United States and who was promoted deputy to the new spy boss on McCone's departure.

Yet, certain aspects of the "recent history" of CIA and particularly its activities in South Vietnam lead to the conclusion that more than personal reasons should be sought behind the changes. One should proceed from the fact that the various intelligence organs and particularly the CIA, which can be regarded as the foremost of them, have been selected for a most special role in the conduct of American foreign policy. Under "normal" conditions, the intelligence organs have an information-gathering, sifting, analyzing, and evaluating role in capitalist power politics. The CIA, however, has broken out of these bounds in the United States. Several cases, from the overthrow of Iranian Premier Mossadeq through the U-2 scandal, the Cuban aggression, and to Vietnam, indicate that the CIA has become a political and, in many cases, even a military executive organ, which has not always coordinated its operations with the State Department.

This transformation of the CIA's character was linked primarily with Allen Dulles' name. It was on his initiative that the CIA acquired a special weight in the National Security Council, which concretely determines the actual steps of American foreign policy. Formally, the National Security Council

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supreme advisory organ of the president, an organ endowed with extremely broad powers under the American constitution. The director of the CIA is only one of its dozens of members. Typical, however, is a quotation in Allen Dulles' book, "The Craft of Intelligence," on the real role of the director of the CIA. According to this quotation, former President Turman defined that role as follows: "Each time the National Security Council considers a certain policy--in southeast Asia, for instance--it immediately consults the head of the CIA for an estimation of the possible effect of that policy."

During President Kennedy's tenure of office, with particular regard to the fact that the failure of the aggression against Cuba revealed to the president and his immediate associates not only the relations and identical interests of the CIA and the most extreme aggressive circles, but also the often false and misleading nature of information provided by the CIA, attempts were made to change this situation. Their essence was first to try to "thrust back" the CIA within its original data-collecting, analyzing, and coordinating scrope. When this failed to produce satisfactory results, the jurisdiction of the military intelligence agency, the "Defense Intelligence Agency,"--DIA--which is directly attached to the Pentagon, began to be enhanced. This ushered in a sharp struggle for influence behind the scenes of the American intelligence service. the DIA scored some significant successes at first, primarily because McNamara, secretary of defense then and now, sided with Kennedy in this struggle.
Another reason was the fact that several members of the brain trust, who are, by the way, still in office, such as McGeorge Bundy, adviser on national security, and economics professor Rostow, head of a State Department long-range political planning section, who worked as intelligence experts during the war at the wartime organ of American intelligence--Office of Strategic Services--supported President Kennedy in the implementation of his plans.

It is particularly important from the viewpoint of the present changing of the guard that precisely South Vietnam has been one of the most important areas of the CIA-DIA struggle for position. The Diem clique, along with a significant group of the general staff, were regarded as CIA agents even prior to President Kennedy's decision on a large-scale intervention. As for Khanh, the constantly recurring hero of the cavalcade of the memorable generals' coups, he counted as a DIA agent.

It goes without saying that this struggle reflected a clash of views, not over the essence of aggressive politics, but over the most expedient way of application. Therefore, its significance for the world at large only went so far as it has exposed the tactics and lineup of forces, in which the adherents of various shades of aggressive politics struggle for power. If we consider the present changing of the guard from this viewpoint, we can conclude that President Johnson is making another attempt to unify the various intelligence organs, this time by placing CIA leadership into what he considers as trustworthy and "loyal" Texan hands. Of course, only the future can show the effect of this experiment. In any case, more than a little doubt is reflected by the remark in the New York TIMES editorial, "The Master Spy," that "the coordination of intelligence agencies jealous of privileges should require more experience."

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